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Case Notes
Administrative Law-Dismissal of Civil Servant-Scott v. Macy,App.
D.C-, 349 F.2d 182 (1965).
FOLLOWING COMPETITIVE EXAMINATION FOR FEDERAL civil service employment, ap-
pellant was notified in February 1962 that he had qualified for personnel positions at
grade levels GS-9, 11 and 12, subject to further investigation to be conducted by the
Civil Service Commission.' In April 1962, he was confronted by a Commission in-
vestigator and asked to explain a 1947 arrest for "loitering," a 1951 arrest "for in-
vestigation," and "information [in the possession of the Civil Service Commission]
indicating that you are a homosexual." Appellant explained the circumstances of the
1947 arrest, stated that he was "not specifically charged with a law violation" in 1951,
and refused to comment on the alleged homosexuality because he did "not believe
the question is pertinent in so far as job performance is concerned."
2
On May 16, 1962, appellant's name was removed from the rolls of applicants for
the competitive service under the applicable civil service regulation.3 He then re-
quested a "specification of how, when, and where [he had allegedly] conducted him-
self immorally so that he might adequately answer the broad, indefinite allegation of
immoral conduct." 4 The Commission's Board of Appeals and Review5 responded
1 REv. STAT. § 1753 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964):
The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations for the admission of per-
sons into the civil service of the United States as may best promote the efficiency thereof,
and ascertain the fitness of each candidate in respect to age, health, character, knowl-
edge, and ability for the branch of service into which he seeks to enter; and for this
purpose he may employ suitable persons to conduct such inquiries, and may prescribe
their duties and establish regulations for the conduct of persons who may receive ap-
pointments in the civil service.
See also 5 C.F.R. §§22.103-104,22.201 (Supp. 1963).
2 Scott v. Macy, . App. D.C. - 349 F.2d 182, 183 (1965).
8 The Commission relied on 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (1964):
Section 731.201. Reasons for disqualification:
Subject to Subpart C of this part, the Commission may deny an applicant examina-
tion, deny an eligible appointment, and instruct an agency to remove an appointee
for any of the following reasons:
(b) Criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct;
'Scott v. Macy, supra note 2, - App. IY.C. -, 349 F.2d at 183.
5 For the general procedure and purpose of the Board of Review, see Exec. Order No.
10987, 27 Fed Reg. 550 (1962).
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only that "the record disclosed convincing evidence that you have engaged in homo-
sexual conduct, which is considered contrary to generally recognized and accepted
standards of morality ... " In his final prayer for relief, appellant requested the Com-
mission to "assume that I have engaged in homosexual conduct," and upon that
basis, unsuccessfully contended that it was error for the Commission to rule that
homosexuals are unsuitable for federal employment. Having exhausted his adminis-
trative remedies, appellant filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia
on April 23, 1963 as provided by the Administrative Procedure Act.6 After various
motions by the plaintiff and the Department of Justice as attorney for the Govern-
ment, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on January
22, 1964. This decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit where it was reversed. Chief Judge Bazelon, writing for
a two to one majority, held that the Commission may not rely on a determination of
"immoral conduct," based only on such vague labels as "homosexual" or "homo-
sexual conduct" as grounds for disqualification. The Commission must specify the
conduct it finds immoral and state how that conduct is related to occupational com-
petence or fitness.7
Federal agency action affecting its employees has been of recurring moment in the
courts due to the various legislative enactments controlling the Government as an
employer. Though the original Civil Service Act of 18838 was primarily concerned
with the examination and appointment of persons, it paved the way for the Lloyd-
La Follette Act 9 which provided the first statutory prohibition against summary or
groundless discharge of classified employees. In the instant case, however, since the
appellant was an applicant with less protection than an employee, Judge Bazelon
chose not to rely on these statutes but turned to a higher authority and said "he [ap-
pellant] is not without constitutional protection. The Constitution does not distin-
guish between applicants and employees; both are entitled, like other people, to
equal protection against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment by the Govern-
ment."10
The early attitude of the courts toward review of administrative action can be de-
0Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011
(1964). Since the United States Civil Service Commission is not a corporate entity which
Congress has authorized to be sued, a suit involving the action of the Commission generally
must be brought against the individual commissioners. Authority to sue the Commission as
an entity is not conferred either by the Hatch Act [5 U.S.C. § 118 (k) (c)] or the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952).
'Scott v. Macy, supra note 2, - App. D.C.., 349 F.2d at 185. The Department of Justice
has advised that the Solicitor General will not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in
the Supreme Court in this case. It appears that the district court has not yet filed an order
for the Commission to comply with the Court of Appeals decision.
822 Stat. 403 (1883), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 632 (1964).
937 Stat. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1964). This act is still the basic law
controlling dismissal of classified personnel. Safeguards were added by the Veterans' Pre-
ference Act, 58 Stat. 387 (1944) now 5 U.S.C. § 851-69 (1964) and Exec. Order No. 10987,
note 3 supra. For further discussion of this topic see Murphy, Judicial Review of the Re-
moval of Federal Employees: A Reexamination, 22 Fr. B. J. 25 (1962); also Comment, 49
IowA L. REV. 891 (1964).
10 Scott v. Macy, supra note 2, - App. D.C. -., 349 F.2d at 183-184. See also Schactman v.
Dulles, 96 App. D.C. 287, 225 F.2d 938 (1955) quoted in the majority opinion.
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scribed as a policy of no review. In the early case of Decatur v. Paulding, Chief Jus-
tice Taney, speaking for the Supreme Court, said that "the interference of the courts
with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of govern-
ment, would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied, that
such a power was never intended to be given to them."'" The reluctance on the part
of the courts to review administrative decisions seemingly resulted from an inability
of the courts to find a compromise between the extremes of complete review and no
review, with the latter considered the lesser of two evils.
12
It was not until the turn of the century that the courts hit upon the idea
of "limited review"' 3 as an appropriate course of judicial action unless Congress spe-
cifically provides against it. In American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
the Supreme Court held "that the conduct of the Post Office Department is part of
the administrative department of government ... , but that does not necessarily and
always oust the courts of jurisdiction to grant relief to a party aggrieved. ... The
acts of all its officers must be justified by some law, and in case an official violates the
law to the injury of an individual, the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant
relief."'
4
After some controversy, the idea of limited review became reasonably established
and later decisions reflect the idea of a presumption of reviewability in the absence
of an affirmative indication of legislative intent to the contrary, or of some special
reason for unreviewability growing out of the subject matter or the circumstances.15
During this period, instances where the courts denied review of administrative ac-
tion in the absence of legislative prohibition were usually due to the nature of the
circumstances.3 6
The theories pro and con the advisability of a policy of judicial review of adminis-
trative determinations were rendered moot in 1946, however, by the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act which substantially increased the scope of judicial
review.17 With the base of its authority so broadened by statute, it was conceivable
that the courts would further expand their control over agency action. They chose,
however, a policy of judicial restraint.18 Followed to its logical conclusion, the ma-
l 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515. This view was followed (at times in stronger language) in
Hadden v. Merrit, 115 U.S. 25 (1885) and Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
12 Cf. 4 DAVIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 28.07 et seq. (1958).
"Id. at § 31. "Limited Review" is restricted to questions such as those of jurisdiction,
fair procedure, statutory interpretation, and substantial evidence.
"1 American School of Magnetic Healing v. Mc Annulty, 187 U.S. 94, 108 (1902).
E.g., Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167 (1936); Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co.,
305 U.S. 177 (1938); R.F.C. v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163 (1943); Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
"6E.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) (government merely a purchaser);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (President's recognition of a foreign government);
Lukedke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (exigencies of war).
1" Supra note 6, § 1009. Judicial Review of Agency Action:
Except so far as (1) Statutes preclude judicial review or (2) Agency action is by law
committed to agency discretion:
(a) Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be
entitled to judicial review thereof. (Emphasis added).
See Chicago and Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S.Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Se-
curities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); International
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jority of the courts have restricted the scope of their review to a rough equivalent of
the "limited review" which had developed prior to the Administrative Procedure
Act.19 This ratiocination carried over into those decisions affecting administrative
determinations made in the agency's capacity as an employer. The majority of the
courts today will not interfere with the action of an administrative agency, so long as
there has been substantial compliance with statutory and procedural requirements,
since this would be substituting the judiciary's judgment for that of the administra-
tive officer.
20
Against this weight of authority, there has been, of late, a trend away from this re-
stricted outlook on the part of the courts, to an idea of a broader supervisory judicial
function which had been developing earlier this century but was curtailed at the
time of the Administrative Procedure Act. Perhaps the clearest expression of this
trend was given by Mr. Justice Black in the 1960 case of Pennsylvania R. Co.
v. United States where he said: "We decided some years ago that while a mere 'ab-
stract declaration' on some issue by the Interstate Commerce Commission may not
be judicially reviewable, an order that determines a 'right or obligation' so that 'legal
consequences' will flow from it is reviewable."
2' 1
It is noteworthy that this decision relied little on 5 U.S.C. §1009, but rather on a
broad notion of a presumption of reviewability in instances where administrative
determinations affect rights or impose obligations. The instant case reflects this view,
at least by implication. Ostensibly, Judge Bazelon based his decision on a lack of
specificity due to the Commission's generalization of the conduct it found immoral.
However, as Judge Burger points out in his dissent, appellant had requested the Com-
mission to assume that he had engaged in homosexual conduct, which would seem-
ingly relieve the Commission of any duty to be more specific. When asked to com-
ment on his alleged homosexuality by the Commission investigator, appellant did
not ask for specifics or make a denial, but rather challenged the right of the Com-
mission to inquire at all into his sexual habits.
As to the substantive question of whether homosexuality may be asserted as a bar
to federal employment, Scott raised it but not without buffering it with the proce-
dural issue. Still, if all three opinions are taken together, one gets a clear picture of
the majority's attitude whether express or implied. It has been noted that Judge
Workers Order v. Mc Grath, 86 App. D.C. 287, 182 F.2d 368 (1950); Willapoint Oysters v.
Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); Atlantic and Gulf
Stevedores, Inc. v. Michalski, 144 F. Supp. 475 (D. Md. 1956); United States ex. rel. Mav-
rokelfalus v. Murff, 94 F. Supp. 643 (D. Md. 1950).
'9 For recent cases, see General Motors Corp. v. United States, 324 F.2d 604 (6th Cir.
1963); Patten v. Railroad Retirement Board, 313 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1963); Hoffman v. Ribi-
coff, 305 F.2d I (8th Cir. 1962); Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines v. United States, 225 F. Supp.
755 (D. Ore. 1963); aff'd 378 U.S. 125 (1963); United States v. ICC, 221 F. Supp. 584 (D.D.C.
1963).
t°E.g., Lawyer v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 501 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 977 (1959);
Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Dauber v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), affirmed in part, vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, 321 F.2d
31 (2d Cir. 1963).
11 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202, 205 (1960) (quoting from Rochester
Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939). See also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S.
184 (1958); Mc Culloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
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Bazelon, writing for the divided majority22 in the two to one decision for reversal,
rested his decision on Constitutional grounds. 23 "Appellant's right to be free from
government defamation requires that the Government justify the necessity for im-
posing the stigma of disqualification for 'immoral conduct'." 2 4 (Emphasis added).
Judge McGowan in his concurring opinion joined in the result reached by Judge
Bazelon but made a point of putting the Constitutional question aside as he felt the
Government's action was inconsistent with the Congressional purpose to be inferred
from 5 U.S.C. §631.25 The split between the majority in the means to reach the same
end result is especially significant when contrasted with Judge Burger's strong dis-
sent. "Because in my view Appellant has waived his procedural contentions I turn
to a consideration of his substantive argument that homosexual conduct is an ar-
bitrary ground for exclusion from employment. This is the argument which, by in-
ference at least, Judge Bazelon considers open by suggesting that the Commission
ought to spell out the relationship between homosexual conduct and suitability for
federal employment." 26 Thus, while the majority opinion does not treat the substan-
tive question directly, both Judges McGowan and Burger appeared to have felt that
a previously unquestioned practice on the part of the executive has been made a
debatable proposition by Judge Bazelon.
There is no law or executive order which specifically bars a homosexual from em-
ployment in the Government. The practice of the Civil Service Commission as in
this case is to bar the applicant under a federal regulation. 27 The reasons for disquali-
fication of an applicant are the same as those applicable to the discharge of an em-
ployee. 28 In the absence of law and executive order, it would seem that it has been
taken for granted that homosexuality is immoral and thus a bar to government em-
ployment. The Congress has seen fit to make its attitude quite clear:
That those who engage in homosexuality and other perverted sex activities
are unsuitable in the federal government. This conclusion is based upon the
11 Since Judge Bazelon's opinion stands alone, it is not a mandate of the court in regard
to the substantive question.
2 Supra note 2, - App. D.C. , 349 F.2d at 183-184.
2 -Id, - App. D.C. w, 349 F.2d at 185. See also Money v. Anderson, 93 App. D.C. 130, 208
F.2d 34 (1953).
REv. STAT. § 1753 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964):
The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations for the admission of per-
sons into the civil service of the United States as may best promote the efficiency thereof,
and ascertain the fitness of each candidate in respect to age, health, character, knowledge,
and ability for the branch of service into which he seeks to enter; and for this purpose
he may employ suitable persons to conduct such inquiries, and may prescribe their
duties and establish regulations for the conduct of persons who may receive appoint-
ments in the civil service.
2 Supra note 2, - App. D.C. -, 349 F.2d at 189.
Supra note 3.
5 C.F.R. § 752.104. General Standards:
(a) An agency may not take an adverse action against an employee covered by this part
except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. Among the reasons
that constitute "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service" for this purpose
are the reasons for disqualification of an applicant listed in § 731.201 (b)-(g) of this
title. These reasons may be based on pre-appointment as well as on post-appointment
factors.
1965]
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fact that persons who indulge in such degraded activity are committing not only
illegal and immoral acts, but they also constitute security risks in positions of
public trust.
29
In insuring that this danger be prevented, the subcommittee reaffirmed the use of
5 C.F.R. §731.201 (b) and said that the Civil Service Commission as well as all the
agencies of Government should be very vigilant in its implementation. It was the
opinion of the subcommittee that, should every effort be made, 5 C.F.R. §731.201
(b) is, and would remain, sufficient to the task of keeping those at whom it was aimed
out of government employ.
Nevertheless, the problem has been attracting more and more attention since the
Senate's investigation and report in 1950. This attention has been focused as a result
of the joining of two separate judicial trends: first, the courts increasing concern
over the rights of federal employees and applicants discussed above and secondly, a
re-evaluation of homosexuality itself.
3 0
Homosexuality is becoming looked upon more as a moral or psychiatric problem
properly handled by private authorities rather than a legal problem necessitating
criminal action. The Reporters of the MODEL PENAL CODE proposed that consensual
homosexual relations between adults be excluded from criminal punishment.3 1 While
this proposal was not incorporated into the final draft of the CODE,
3 2 the new Illinois
Criminal Code (1961) has followed the general view taken by the Reporters and has
eliminated deviate sexual conduct as a crime except where force is involved, or where
it occurs in a public place, or where there is a specified age disparity between the
2 Subcommittee on Investigation of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Ex-
ecutive Departments, now called the Committee of Government Operations, Employment
of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government, S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong. 2nd
Ses. 19 (1950).
80 There has been and still is a wide diversity of opinion of what homosexuality is and
what causes it. For example, see S. Doc. No. 241, p.2 and 3, n.29 supra; Committee on Homo-
sexual Offenses and Prostitution, Report, CMD. No. 257 (1955) which is commonly known
in this country as the "Wolfenden Report," Part II, chap. 3, sec. 18-21. REPORT ON HoMo-
SEXUALITY WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS OF THIS PROBLEM IN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, Com-
mittee on Cooperation with Governmental (federal) Agencies, Agencies for the Group for
the Advancement of Psychiatry, Report No. 30, January 1955.
81 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955). Comment:
Our proposal to exclude from the criminal law all sexual practices not involving
force, adult corruption of minors, or public offense is based on the following grounds.
No harm to the secular interests of the community is involved in a typical sex practice
in private between consenting adult partners. This area of private morals is the dis-
tinctive concern of spiritual authorities... Existence of the criminal threat probably
deters some people from seeking psychiatric or other assistance for their emotional prob-
lems, certainly conviction and imprisonment are not conducive to cures. Further, there
is the fundamental question of the protection to which every individual is entitled
against state interference in his personal affairs when he is not hurting others. (Em-
phasis added).
8 Although the Advisory Committee unanimously approved the proposal, the Council of
the Institute, at its March 1955 meeting, voted in favor of criminal punishment. Some mem-
bers felt that, although the Reporter's position was a rational one, it would be totally un-
acceptable to American legislatures and hence would prejudice acceptance of the Code
generally. Other members of the Council opposed the position on the ground that sodomy
is a cause or symptom of moral decay and therefore should be repressed by law.
[Vol. xv
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parties. The Wolfenden Report 3 has also supported this view.3 4 In the District of
Columbia, the question of whether homosexuality in private is a crime under the
D.C. Code3 5 has been asked and answered in the negative.36
The question of whether homosexuality is a crime is a crucial one to the potential
homosexual applicant for a government job as well as for the homosexual em-
ployee.3 7 The courts in affirming agency disqualification and dismissal of homosexuals
usually do so on the grounds of "criminal conduct" or, if on "immoral conduct," rein-
force this determination by indicating its criminal nature. 38 This was the attitude
taken by the Senate's report in 1950.39 The question thus arises of the result when the
courts must rely on "immoral conduct" alone as a criterion for disqualification or
dismissal. Scott would seem to give an indirect answer. Another case which gives a
clue to the attitude to be taken is Pelicone v. Hodge4O treating a related area. In
that case the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that
a government employee's taking of a hotel room with a prostitute did not constitute
"criminal conduct" which would support dismissal of the government employee where
the conduct charged was not a crime under applicable laws even though the employee
had admitted his act to police and had forfeited collateral following an arrest. The
court in reversing for the appellant commented: "We note, moreover, that no case
characterizing non-criminal conduct as 'infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously
disgraceful' has been cited to us. The usual inquiry whether conduct which is ad-
mittedly criminal is also infamous, immoral, etc." 41
On the other hand, however, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Dew v. Halaby said that the action of the Federal Aviation Agency in
removing an air traffic controller, who was an air force veteran, from his civil service
position because of alleged pre-employment homosexual acts and smoking of mari-
juana cigarettes, was not arbitrary and capricious. 42 Thus, both positive and negative
approaches have been taken while neither has treated and answered the problem
"on all fours." Security positions aside, shall the individual's right to live his life as
he sees fit, absent criminal conduct, be superior to the majority's concept of morality?
Scott is a distinct step in that direction, and the answer to this proposition should lie
in the near future.
8 Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, supra note 30.
3 Ibid. Part II ch. 5, § 52. ". .. [W]e reached the conclusion that legislation which covers
acts in the third category we have mentioned, homosexual acts committed between adults
in private, goes beyond the proper sphere of the law's concern. We do not think that it is
proper for the law to concern itself with what a man does in private unless it can be shown
to be so contrary to the public good that the law ought to intervene in its function as the
guardian of that public good."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1112(a) (1961).
Guarro v. U.S., 99 App. D.C. 97, 237 F.2d 578 (1956); Rittenour v. District of Columbia,
163 A.2d 558 (1960).
87 Supra note 2.
88Repouille v. U. S. 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947); Wyngaard v. Kennedy, 111 App. D.C.
197, 295 F.2d 184 (1961).
0 Supra note 29, at 3, 13.
40116 App. D.C. 32, 320 F.2d 754 (1963).
"Id. at 35, n.8, 320 F.2d at 758, n.8.
'2 115 App. D.C. 171, 317 F.2d 582 (1963).
1965]
Catholic University Law Review
Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy-Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
IN NOVEMBER, 1961, DEFENDANTS ESTELLE T. GRISWOLD AND C. LEE BUXTON, operated
in New Haven, The Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut for the purpose of
providing information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons wishing
to practice contraception. During this period several women went to the center and
received instruction as to the various methods of birth control and birth control de-
vices. Subsequently they used this information in marital relations with their hus-
bands. In so doing they violated § 53-32 of the General Statutes of Connecticut,'
which provides:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose
of preventing conception shall be fined not less than Fifty Dollars ($50.00) or
imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or both be fined and
imprisoned.
2
By the same act, the defendants also violated §§54-196 of the General Statutes which
provides:
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires, or commands another to
commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender.3
The defendants were arrested and convicted in the Circuit Court for the Sixth
Circuit (New Haven) of violating the aiding and abetting statute and fined $100.00
each.4 The defendants claimed, however, that the statute as so applied violated the
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. The Appellate Division of the Circuit
Court, and the Supreme Court of Errors affirmed.5 On appeal, a 7-2 majority of the
Supreme Court reversed. Speaking for five members of the Court, Mr. Justice Doug-
las declared that §53-32 of the General Statutes of Connecticut was an unconstitu-
tional violation of the right of marital privacy protected by the Bill of Rights.6
The right to privacy found its inspiration in a classic article written by Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW of 1890.7 The courts
were slow to recognize this new "right," and the few early decisions rejected the argu-
ments of those who advanced it.s It was not until 1905 that the right was judicially
accepted. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company,9 the Supreme Court
of Georgia not only asserted that this cause of action was maintainable under the
common law, but that the right to privacy was also guaranteed by the state and fed-
eral constitutions.
I These statutes have since been repealed by the Connecticut legislature.
2
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-32 (1958).
aCONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-196 (1958).
' N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1962, p. 16.
5151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 (1964).
0Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).7 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
8Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902); Atkin-
son v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899).
9 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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The right of privacy, within certain limits, is a right derived from the natural
law, recognized by the principles of municipal law, and guaranteed to persons
in this state both by the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of
Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no person shall be deprived of
liberty except by due process of law.10
From Pavesich to the present day nearly all state courts have passed on the right
of the individual to be free from unnecessary invasions of privacy," the right being
founded either in the particular state's common law or in its statutes.12 Very few,
however, have ventured as far as the Georgia decision to determine whether this right
is constitutionally guaranteed. 13 Those that have adopted the Pavesich think-
ing and based the right to privacy on the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' 4
Unlike these few state courts, the Supreme Court of the United States had not ex-
pressly ruled until now on a general constitutional guarantee of the right to pri-
vacy. Nevertheless, in determining cases dealing with specific portions of the first,
fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments they have come very close.
The most dramatic of these decisions was the series dealing with the "search and
seizure" clause of the fourth amendment culminating in Boyd v. United States15 and
Olmstead v. United States.'6
In Boyd, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the majority, extended the meaning of
the fourth and fifth amendments beyond the scope of their actual wording in declar-
ing unconstitutional a statute authorizing the production of private books, papers,
and letters:
The principles laid down in the opinion affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the cases then
before the court with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions
on the part of the government and its employee of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life.
17
The attempt of Justice Bradley to broaden significantly the constitutional protec-
tion of the fourth amendment was drastically limited in 1928 by the decision of Chief
Justice Taft in Olmstead v. United States.'8 Though Boyd was not overruled and
Taft conceded that the fourth and fifth amendments must be liberally construed,
yet, in the words of the Chief Justice, "... that cannot justify enlargement of the lan-
'ld. at 71.
11Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee and West Virginia.
"n New York, Oklahoma, Utah and Virginia have enacted statutes.
" Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (App. Dist. 1931); Reed v. Washington
Times Co., 55 Wash. Law Rep. 182 (Dist. Ct. 1927); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159
S.W.2d 291 (1942); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952); Bednarik v.
Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (Ch. 1940).
'"Smith, The History and Future of the Legal Battle Over Birth Control, 49 CORNELL
L. Q. 275, 302 (1964).
'3116 U.S. 616 (1886).
"'277 U.S. 438 (1928).
"Boyd v. United States, supra note 14, at 630.
18 Supra note 15.
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guage employed beyond possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and
effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight."'19
Brandeis vigorously disagreed and in his famous dissent gave this interpretation of
the fourth amendment wholly consistent with Boyd:
... every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the in-
dividual, whatever the means employed must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
20
Commenting on this dissent of Brandeis, Beamey in his article, The Constitutional
Right of Privacy in the Supreme Court,2' said:
The theory of Brandeis rejected by all but one of his brethren, would have made
the Fourth Amendment a guaranty of a broad right to privacy.
22
To be sure, vociferous exponents of a broad constitutional right continued to advo-
cate its acceptance in fiery dissents; 23 but the fourth amendment has, from that time,
been so construed as to preclude any general right to privacy.
24
Though the fourth and fifth amendment cases were the most dramatic, they are
not alone in presenting the Court with aspects and arguments concerning personal
privacy, for both the first and the fourteenth amendment controversies have con-
tributed their share.
The first amendment cases involving privacy have generally followed two theories.
The first is centered about freedom of association and protection of privacy in one's
15 Id. at 465.
10 Id. at 478.
2'Beamey, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUPREME
COURT REV. 212.
21Id. at 227.
23 Mr. Justice Murphy in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, at 139-140 (1942):
Whether the search of private quarters is accomplished by placing on the outer walls
of the sanctum a detectaphone that transmits to the outer listener the intimate details
of a private conversation, or by new methods of photography that penetrate walls or
overcome distances, the privacy of the citizen is equally invaded by agents of the Gov-
ernment and intimate personal matters are laid bare to view. Such invasions of privacy,
unless they are authorized by warrant ... are at one with the evils which have hereto-
fore been held to be within the fourth amendment, and equally call for remedial
action.
Mr. Justice Douglas in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, at 765 (1952), referring to
the dissent of Brandeis in Olmstead: "That philosophy is applicable not only to a detecta-
phone placed against the wall or a mechanical device designed to record the sounds from
telephone wires but also to the 'walky talky' radio used in the present case. The nature of
the instrument that science or engineering develops is not important. The controlling, de-
cisive factor is the invasion of privacy against the command of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments."
Justice Douglas reiterated this position in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, at
513 (1961), though this time in a concurring opinion: "Our concern should not be with
the trivialities of the local law of trespass, as the opinion of the Court indicates. But neither
should the command of the fourth amendment be limited by nice distinctions turning on
the kind of electronic equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should be with
whether the privacy of the home was invaded."
21 Beamey, supra note 20, at 227.
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activities; the decision in NAACP v. Alabama25 is grounded here. The second is
founded in cases upholding statutes that delimit free speech, on the grounds that
these statutes are protecting one's privacy.26 Cases following the second theory re-
ceived something of a setback in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack27 where the
Supreme Court rejected the idea that the fifth amendment read with the first gave
the patrons on a public bus line a right to privacy from music and advertisements
played on the buses. The Court pointed out that "... however complete his right of
privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others when its
possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a public conveyance." 28
The fourteenth amendment cases, in which the element of privacy was contained,
consider the content of the term "liberty" in the "due process" clause. In Wolf v.
Colorado29 the late Mr. Justice Frankfurter found implicit in the concept of liberty
and "basic to a free society" was "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary in-
trusions by the police which is at the core of the fourteenth amendment."3 0 Thus the
term "liberty" was read to protect privacy from unlawful searches and seizures by the
state.
3'
Prior to Griswold, therefore, it was evident that the Supreme Court would protect
privacy only in relation to some specific constitutional guarantee such as freedom of
association,3 2 freedom from unlawful search and seizure, 3 or freedom from self in-
crimination.3 4 This did not mean, however, that a general right of privacy, standing
on its own was non-existent and various theories had been formulated advancing the
possibility of such a right.3 5 Perhaps the most acceptable was that set out by Beamey
3 6
357 U.S. 449, at 462 (1958), the Court referring to the decisions in American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, at 402 (1950) and United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41, at 46-47 (1953) said: "This Court has recognized the vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations .... Inviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association."
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, at 86-87 (1949). Here the Supreme Court upheld as
constitutional an ordinance of Trenton, New Jersey which prohibited the use of loud-
speakers on public streets. In so doing they recognized that the right of free speech could
not intrude upon the privacy of others. "The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by
who may be offered a pamphlet on the street but cannot be made to take it. In his home
or on the street he is practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by
loudspeakers except through protection of the municipality."
- 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
2s Id. at 464.
- 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) reversed Wolf only as regards to
the exclusionary doctrine and its applicability to the states. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
cept of the fourteenth amendment's right of privacy remained and is cited here for that
purpose.
B Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 28, at 27.
m Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 28.
8 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
13 Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 28.
81 Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 28.
m Pound, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right of Privacy, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 34
(1961).
1 Beamey, supra note 20.
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who hypothesizes, in his discussion of Silverman v. United States,3 7 that an ultimate
means of guaranteeing the right to privacy:
.. would be rather than continue efforts to protect privacy against State or Fed-
eral action by making 'the core of the Fourth Amendment' with all the excep-
tions and limitations that have been engrafted in search and seizure law it is
preferable to view the right to privacy as an essential liberty that deserves pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 8
In this context, how did Justice Douglas in Griswold arrive at the concept of pri-
vacy enunciated in that decision? Did he derive this right from the first amendment,
the fourth amendment, the fifth amendment, or the fourteenth amendment?
The process that Justice Douglas used was essentially one based upon a develop-
ment of the first, the fourth, and the fifth amendments to the Constitution with refer-
ence to the third, the ninth, and the fourteenth. The thesis of this development con-
tained the following points: (1) Specific terminology in an amendment does not pre-
clude additional rights not enumerated; (2) There are rights of privacy contained
in the periphery of several of the guarantees; (3) There is thus a general right to
privacy reflected by specific guarantees of privacy in several of the amendments; (4)
It is within this right to privacy, this "penumbra", that the right to marital privacy
exists and is protected.
Justice Douglas demonstrated how the first amendment, which only specifically
guarantees freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition has been de-
veloped to include the right of association, 39 the right to distribute,4 0 and the right to
receive. 41 Furthermore, the "right of association" of the first amendment, the prohibi-
tion against the quartering of soldiers of the third amendment, freedom from un-
lawful searches and seizures of the fourth amendment, and freedom from self-incrim-
ination of the fifth amendment create protected "zones of privacy". 42 Justice Douglas
then concluded, without stating from which amendment a general right of privacy
proceeds, that, "The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.' 43 Marital pri-
vacy, not mentioned in the Constitution, is protected by a right of privacy also not
mentioned. This right of privacy is not a peripheral right stemming from one of the
amendments but from several of them.
81 107 App. D.C. 144, at 150, 275 F.2d 173, at 178 (1960). Here the majority of the circuit
court held that evidence obtained by electronic eavesdropping would not be excluded from
the trial because it did not violate the fourth amendment in that there had been no physi-
cal entry. Judge Washington dissented saying: "Whether the police, in installing and using
the electronic device, committed a technical trespass upon appellants' property is a matter
which seems immaterial to me . . .eavesdropping of the kind that occurred here may be
held not to abridge any fourth amendment rights. But it does violate, I think, our funda-
mental concept of ordered liberty, as embodied in the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments."
8 Beamey, supra note 20, at 247-248.
19 NAACP v. Alabama, supra note 31.
,0 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
11 Ibid.
,2 Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 6, at 484 (1965).
'a Id. at 485.
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There appears to have been, in the Douglas opinion, a deviation from the tradi-
tional method of constitutional interpretation, a method that Justices Black and
Stewart exemplify in their dissents.
44
It was noted above that Justice Douglas referred to the ninth amendment. This
reference came at the end of a paragraph delineating the zones of privacy in the vari-
ous amendments. 45 There was no effort to explain it in relation to what had pre-
ceded; the amendment was merely quoted and left alone. A question arises as to
what bearing this has on the Court's method of decision.
Of itself the amendment appears to have contributed little or nothing to the ma-
jority opinion; but, read with the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg, it assumes
a position of crucial importance to the majority decision.
The concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg, while concentrating on the ninth
amendment, did not advance a separate basis for the decision, but merely elaborated
a specific portion of the majority opinion.46 It was Goldberg's thesis that ". .. the
ninth amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights
exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent
that this list of rights included there not be exhaustive." 47 If this was the belief of
Justice Douglas as well, as Justice Goldberg inferred,48 then it is quite possible that
Justice Douglas read the right of privacy, and marital privacy with it, into the Bill of
Rights through the ninth amendment and in so doing evolved a novel approach in
terms of constitutional interpretation, 49 even though the ninth amendment as a
source of rights had been the object of some discussion.5 0
"Mr. Justice Black in his dissent remarked: "I get nowhere in this case by talk about a
constitutional 'right of privacy' as an emanation from one or more constitutional provisions.
I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that
government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional pro-
vision." Id. at 509-510.
Mr. Justice Stewart had this to say:
As to the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, I can find nothing in any of
them to invalidate this Connecticut law .... It has not even been argued that this is
a law 'respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.'
And surely, unless the solemn process of constitutional adjudication is to descend to
the level of a play on words, there is not involved here any abridgement of the 'free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' No soldier has been quartered
in any house. There has been no search, and no seizure. Nobody has been compelled to
be a witness against himself." Id. at 528-529.
'5 1d. at 484.
Mr. Justice Goldberg states: "In reaching the conclusion that the right of marital
privacy is protected, as being within the protected penumbra of the specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights, the Court refers to the Ninth Amendment, ante at 484. I add these words
to emphasize the relevance of that Amendment to the Court's holding." Id. at 487.
7Id. at 492.
'1 Id. at 487.
" Under the ninth amendment the Court has expressly found only one right, the right
to engage in political activity. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). It
rejected a ninth amendment contention in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S.
118 (1939), but partially relied on the amendment in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
50 See PATTERSON, THE FORGOTrEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Redlich, Are There Certain
Rights... Retained by the People?, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 787 (1962); Kelsy, The Ninth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L. J. 309 (1936).
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Justice Goldberg implied that his ninth amendment interpretation explained the
majority holding. Justices Harlan and White agreed that there is a right to privacy
in the Constitution but relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Justices Black and Stewart denied that any such right exists and paid particu-
lar attention in their dissents to refuting the ninth amendment argument of Justice
Goldberg. 51 Whether litigants relying on this amendment to obtain recognition of
any other "fundamental right" could hold five members of the Court at this time
is open to conjecture.
Nevertheless, the right to privacy was given clear Supreme Court recognition and
is now unquestionably within the contemplation of the Bill of Rights. The fact that
Griswold did not tie it to a specific guarantee leaves it free to evolve uninhibited by
confusing and contradictory precedent.
52
"I Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 6, at 520, 529-530.
rAYork v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963). Here the circuit court held valid a plaintiff's
right to recover under the civil rights statutes on the basis of a violation of her right to
privacy. Though the case was decided prior to Griswold, it does demonstrate how the new
right might be used.
Estates-Conflict of Laws-Reciprocal Rights of Inheritance-In re Larkin's
Estate, 44 Cal. Rptr. 731 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
ON APRIL 8, 1960, JOHN LARKIN DIED intestate leaving an estate valued at $43,901.08,
consisting in part of $26,000 in real property. On July 8, 1960, Liese Marie Terry
expired testate, leaving an estate of personal property appraised at $9,945.07. The
heirs and legatees were citizens and residents of the Soviet Union. California entered
both proceedings in an attempt to acquire the estates by escheat. The state alleged
that at the time of the deaths there were no reciprocal rights of inheritance on the
part of citizens of the United States to take property upon the same terms and condi-
tions as residents and citizens of the Soviet Union' and, therefore, §2592 of the CALI-
1In re Larkin's Estate, 44 Cal. Rptr. 731 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 reads as follows:
Right of nonresident alien to take realty: Dependence or reciprocal rights. The rights
of aliens not residing within the United States or its territories to take real property
in this state by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms and con-
ditions as residents and citizens of the United States is dependent in each case upon the
existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the United States to take
real property upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the re-
spective countries of which such aliens are residents and the right of aliens not residing
in the United States or its territories to take personal property in this state by suc-
cession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms and conditions as residents
and citizens of the United States is dependent in each case upon the existence of a re-
ciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the United States to take personal property
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FORNIA PROBATE CODE prohibited the legatees in Terry's will and the heirs of the
Larkin estate from taking the property. On consolidation the trial court found that
there existed reciprocal rights as to personal property, and, therefore, the heirs and
legatees could take. As to real property, the court held that the Soviet concept of
state-owned property eliminated the possibility of reciprocal inheritance rights, and,
therefore, the realty should escheat to the state. On appeal, the district court re-
versed the order to distribute the personalty and instructed that the property, real and
personal, escheat to the State of California.3
The ability of residents and nonresident aliens to inherit was subject to limitations
at the common law. They could take personal property in the same manner as citi-
zens, 4 by will 5 or by succession.6 However, an alien could not acquire real property
by descent, 7 and if acquired by purchases or devise9 it was subject to forfeiture to the
state.' 0 Unless, however, the state acted, the title of the alien devisee was supreme,"
even where the devisee was an enemy alien.12 Treaties1 3 and statutes' 4 have removed
the common law land disability of aliens. Today aliens have inheritance rights gen-
erally on a par with citizens. 15 Treaties have abrogated state laws forbidding alien in-
heritance of real estate' 6 if tle alien is a citizen of the particular country with which
the treaty has been contracted.17 If a treaty does not exist, any state may prohibit the
ownership of real property by nonresident aliens.18
Prior to the entrance of the United States into World War II, many states passed
statutes restricting the inheritance rights of nonresident aliens. 19 The federal govern-
upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective countries
of which such aliens are residents.8 Supra note 1.
'Fourdin v. Gowdey, 3 Myl. & K. 383, 40 Eng. Rep. 146 (1834). Richmond v. Milne, 17
La. 312 (1841).
5 Craig v. Leslie, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 563 (1818); Fitz Simmons v. Fitz Simmons, 10 Wend.
N.Y. 9 (1832).
o M'Learn v. Wallace, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 625 (1836); Fergus v. Tomlinson, 126 Kan. 427,
268 Pac. 849 (1928).
Levy v. M'Cartee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 102 (1832); Scanlon v. Wright, 13 Pick (Mass.) 523
(1833).
8Fehn v. Shaw, 201 Ga. 517, 40 S.E.2d 547 (1946); Caparell v. Goodbody, 132 N.J.Eq.
559,29 A.2d 563 (1942).
'Cross v. DeValle, 69 U.S. (1 Wall.) 1 (1863); Martin v. Hunter, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816).
10 Phillips v. Moore, 100 U.S. 208 (1879); Ripley v. Von Zedtwitz, 201 Ky. 513, 256 S.W.
1106 (1923).
n Osterman v. Baldwin, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 116 (1867); Caparell v. Goodbody, supra note
8; Vaux v. Nesbit, 1 McCord's Eq. (S.C.) 352 (1826).
11 Fairfax v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
13 1 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION 28 (3d ed. 1923).
14 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws §§ 288-292 (1938).
"Ibid.
18 Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa 407, 69 N.W. 560 (1896); Kolowat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187
(1961); Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns (N.Y.) 693 (1823).
17 Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453 (1819); Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 33
N.E. 195 (1893).
"Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 Cal. 431, 59 Pac. 787, aff'd. 180 U.S. 333 (1901); Wunderle v.
Wunderle, supra note 17.
Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Satellites to Share in Estates of
American Decedents, 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 297 (1952).
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ment first began to freeze the flow of money to countries conquered by the Nazis in
1940,20 but it was not until June 19, 1941,21 that all assets destined for countries con-
quered by the Nazis were frozen. The feeling of hostility toward Germany and fear
of its confiscating property left to aliens by Americans prompted the legislation. The
central aim of all these statutes was to keep the property of United States residents
out of the hands of hostile foreign governments. 22
The legislation followed two patterns: one typified by New York's statute,23 and
the other by that of California. 24 Under the New York law if it appears for some rea-
son that the beneficiary will not have the use or benefit of the property if presently
conveyed to him, the court will withhold distribution and order the property paid
into the court to be held until such time as he is able to use it.25 The New York stat-
ute has no escheat provision, and the beneficiary's right does not depend upon the
inheritance laws of the country of which he is a citizen and resident. It is designed to
carry out the intention of the testator that the property actually benefits the intended
heirs.2
0
The second type of statute, employed by California 27 and many of the other western
states, 28 applies the reciprocity test to determine if nonresident aliens may take the
property. The California statute was originally passed in 1941.29 It provided that non-
resident aliens could take property, either real or personal, by testamentary disposi-
tion or succession, only if there were a reciprocal right on the part of American citi-
zens to take property on a par with its own citizens. The statute also provided that
the burden of proving the reciprocal right was on the nonresident alien, and in the
absence of such proof, the estate would either be distributed to other heirs or es-
cheat.30 When the statute was passed in 1941, it was accompanied by a statement of
urgency by the California legislature setting forth the reasons for passing the provi-
0 Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400 (1940).
2 Exec. Order No. 8785, 6 Fed. Reg. 2897 (1941).
22Chaitkin, supra note 19.
MCKINNEY'S SURROGATE'S COURT ACT, § 269A: Where it shall appear that a legatee, dis-
tributee or beneficiary of a trust would not have the benefit or use or control of the
money or other property due him, or where other special circumstances make it appear
desirable that such payment should be withheld, the decree may direct that such money
or other property be paid into the surrogate's court for the benefit of such legatee, dis-
tributee, beneficiary of a trust or such person or persons who may thereafter appear to be
entitled thereto. Such money or other property so paid into court shall be paid out only
by the special order of the surrogate or pursuant to the judgment of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
Other statutes which are similar to New York's are: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2946d (Supp. 1955);
MD. ANN. CODE Art. 93, § 161 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 206, § 27 (Cum. Supp. 1956);
N. J. STAT. ANN., tit. 3A § 25-10 (1953); Omo REV. CODE ANN., tit. 21, § 2113-81 (Page Supp.
1957); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1155-59 (Purdon Cum. 1957); R. I. GEN. L.4ws, § 83-18-13
(1956).
1 Supra note 2.
'In re Bold's Estate, 173 Misc. 545, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 291 (1940).
"CAL. LAW REvIXSON COMM., Vol. 2, B-18 (1959).
27Supra note 2.
2See, e.g., IowA CODE § 567.8 (1962); MONT. REV. CODE ANN., § 91-520 (1947); NEV. REV.
STAT., § 134.230 (1957); ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957).
0 CAL. PROia. CODE, § 259 (1941).
'0 CAL. PROB. CODE, §§ 259.1, 259.2 (1941).
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sion.31 Their reasons may be summarized as follows: many states were at war or pre-
paring to enter the war; California citizens were being deprived of property left to
them by aliens; foreign governments were confiscating property intended for their
citizens and using it to bolster their war machines.
After the United States entered the war and the Alien Property Custodian was
vested with the rights of the alien in hostile nations, 32 the Attorney General attacked
the statute as an unconstitutional invasion of the field of foreign relations. 33 His argu-
ment was that the provision requiring reciprocity "seeks to promote the right of
American citizens to inherit abroad by offering to aliens reciprocal rights of inherit-
ance in California."34 The Attorney General maintained that this was a matter for the
federal government to settle on a national basis. The Court, rejecting the argument
as farfetched, held the statute constitutional. It held that California had the right to
legislate in the absence of a federal treaty.
In 1945, while the statute was being tested in the courts, the California legislature
amended it,35 and provided a presumption of reciprocity, that in the absence of a peti-
tion filed prior to distribution, the presumption would be conclusive. In any case,
the burden of proving the lack of reciprocity was placed on the petitioner. The 1945
amendment also repealed the escheat provision, but after the decision in Clark v.
Allen holding the statute constitutional,3 6 the legislature re-enacted it in virtually
original form.3 7 The finding of reciprocal rights was again a matter of fact, which if
supported by substantial evidence, had to be sustained in the appellate courts.3 8 In
1957, the statute was again amended 39 deleting the words "fact of" before "existence
of the reciprocal rights." This made the existence of such rights a matter of law, and
gave the appeal courts the authority to judicially notice foreign law and to make a
decision de novo.
40
In the Estate of Gogabashvele,41 the court examined Russian law and found ex
post facto laws, bills of attainder, concentration of authority in the Communist Party,
confused legislative output, secret edicts and decrees, and a judiciary without inde-
pendence. All of this, the court determined, demonstrated that the Soviet system is
inherenty incapable of insuring genuine rights.
... [T]here is no such thing as a right in the U.S.S.R. as we understand it in this
country. Soviet statutes merely confer conditional rights or privileges which,
"'CAL. PROB. CODE, § 2.
Vesting Order No. 762, 8 Fed. Reg. 1252.
1Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
'Id. at 516-517.
CAL. PROB. CODE, § 259 (1945).
88 Supra note 33.
'"CAL. PROB. CODE, § 259 (1947).
8In re Arbulich's Estate, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433 (1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 897
(1953); In re Schuttig's Estate, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950); In re Leefer's Estate 127
Cal. App. 2d 550, 274 P.2d 239 (1954); In re Karban's Estate, 118 Cal. App. 2d 240, 257
P.2d 649 (1953).
CAL. PROB. CODE, § 259.1 (1957).
" In re Gogabashvele, 195 Cal. App.2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1961).1Ibid.
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being granted by the grace of the government, may be withdrawn without the
consent of the citizens at the whim of the government.42
It would seem, therefore, that no matter how explicit Soviet laws purporting to es-
tablish reciprocal inheritance rights may be, Russian citizens would be ineligible to
inherit under §259.48
Justice Fourt's opinion in Larkin relied on the Gogabashvele finding that in Rus-
sia there are no legal rights, and rejected the argument that since that time there
have been significant changes in Russian law which have established those rights.
The California Law Commission and others44 have recommended that §§259 and
259.1 be replaced by a statute patterned after New York's. These authorities have
shown that the present law is unsuccessful in preventing assets from going to un-
friendly countries.4 5 These countries have found it expedient not to discriminate
against American heirs, since the number of estates left to Americans in these coun-
tries is inconsequential when compared to the number of American estates with heirs
in the hostile countries.40
If one views these statutes in the narrow confines of estate law, the New York stat-
ute is clearly preferable since it is better designed to carry out the intention of the
testator. However, one must consider the overriding interest of the federal govern-
ment in the area of foreign relations. A preferable solution to the problem of
nonresident aliens' inheritance rights would be a federal statute incorporating
California's reciprocity requirement, but with a provision for State Department
determination of whether such reciprocity exists. Such a statute would not only in-
sure uniformity, but would strengthen the State Department's bargaining position
when negotiating with foreign nations. Thus, this power, however minute, to shape
relations between the United States and a foreign nation would be in its proper
place-with the federal government.
"Id. at 528.
"Ginsbergs, The Inheritance Rights of Foreigners Under Soviet Law, 1965 IOWA L. REV.
16.
"Comment, 1963 DUKE L. J. 315; Chaitkin, supra note 19.
"In re Nepogodin's Estate, 134 Cal. App.2d 161, 285 P.2d 672 (1955) (Manchurian heir);
In re Kennedy's Estate, 106 Adv. Cal. App. 715, 235 P.2d 837 (1951) (Russian heir).
'In re Miller's Estate, 104 Cal. App. 2d 1, 230 P.2d 667 (1951).
Labor Law-Unfair Labor Practices-Lockouts Detroit Newspaper Publish-
er's Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965).
UPON CHARGES FILED BY THE TEAMSTERS, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board issued a complaint against the Detroit News, the Detroit Free Press,
and the Detroit Newspaper Publishers Association. The Board found only the News
guilty of a prima facie unfair labor practice in violation of §8 (a) (1) and (3) of the
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National Labor Relations Act' for locking out 2 its employees.8 The Publishers Asso-
ciation and the News petitioned the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals to set aside the
Board's Order, and the Board sought enforcement of it. The Court of Appeals va-
cated the Board's order and denied enforcement, 4 relying on the recent Supreme
Court case, American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,5 which allowed use of the lockout
after an impasse in negotiations as an economic weapon. In its decision the Court
of Appeals refused to remand the case to the Board for reconsideration,6 but found
instead that there were no grounds to support a finding of §8 (a) (1) and (3) viola-
tions.7 The court, on July 16, 1965, denied the Board's petition for rehearing.
The Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News are the sole members of the Detroit
Newspaper Publishers Association, a voluntary unincorporated association, formed
for the purpose of negotiating and administering labor contracts and handling the
labor relations of its members.8 The Association is not a multi-employer unit, but its
members' contracts with the Teamsters Union have been basically the same.9 In the
negotiations for a new contract with the Teamsters in the spring of 1962, the News
was interested in 10 of approximately 18 issues being negotiated between the Free
Press and the Union.10
The Union had been negotiating separately with both papers since the previous
October." Although the issues in dispute were basically the same, the Union did not
press both papers simultaneously in the final negotiation stages. The Free Press was
first in line to be faced with the threat of a strike.1 2 The Union's probable reason for
this was to maximize the effectiveness of the strike against the one paper by adding to
its loss of production, the loss of market to the other competitor paper not shut down.
Also, this tactic would ease the economic pressure on the Union by leaving unem-
ployed only one unit of its members at any one time.
'29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964): "Unfair Labor Practices":
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this
title: ...
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or con-
dition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion ....
2American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 at 321 (1965). Detroit Publishers Assn.
v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527, n.2 (6th Cir. 1965). A lockout is a temporary layoff of employees in
connection with a labor dispute when there is work available. Problems of its legal defini-
tion are examined by Trial Examiner Charles Schneider in Betts Cadillac-Olds, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. 269, 282-83 (1951).
8 Evening News Ass'n. 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964).
' Detroit Publishers Ass'n. v. NLRB, supra note 2.
5 American Ship Building, supra note 2.
6 Detroit Publishers Ass'n. v. NLRB, supra note 2, at 530.
7Id. at 531.
8 Id. at 529.
9 A multi-employer unit is a group of employers who treat their collective employees as
one. The unit is established by the consent of all the parties, and the essential element is
the participation of all the employers in the unit in joint bargaining negotiations with the
employees' bargaining representative. Associated Shoe Industries of Southeastern Mass.,
Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 224 (1949).
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Officials of the two newspapers met on April 9th and 10th and agreed to defend
against the Union's demands by forming a united front. 13 The News agreed to support
the Free Press in the event it was struck by not publishing, thereby treating the strike
on one as a strike of both. They kept this agreement secret. 14
On April 11, when contract negotiations broke down, the Teamster union struck
the Free Press. Five days later, pursuant to the secret agreement, the News notified
its employees not to return to work until notified. On April 19, the Teamsters' strike
with The Free Press was ended and the News employees returned to work.15
The Board's main concern in the area of lockout is "the balancing of the conflict-
ing legitimate interests,"' 6 but it originally distinguished two different functions of
the lockout in determining the role of such in the scheme of collective bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act.17 The employer might use the lockout to
prevent economic losses or business disruption to himself and his customers in the
face of an imminent strike by shutting down his operations at the least damaging time,
instead of awaiting the strike at a more critical time. This defensive use of a lockout
was approved by the Board.' 8 Such a use diminishes the effectiveness of the employ-
ees' statutory right to strike,' 9 but it gives effect to another policy of the Act which is
to minimize the crippling economic impact of labor-management disputes upon the
community.
2 0
The second use of the lockout is the economic equivalent of a strike. 21 The em-
ployer can lock out his employees during negotiations to bring pressure on them for
the purpose of enhancing his bargaining position. This use of the lockout, or the
threat of such, made it an offensive weapon rather than a defensive one and was
deemed an unlawful use by the Board.22 The Board could see that this strike-like use
would cause an imbalance in favor of the employer because the employer could per-
manently replace strikers, or stockpile and subcontract, thus avoiding the economic
impact of a strike, 23 but his employees could not effectively counter a lockout. The
Board based its position on the argument that an offensive lockout, of its nature,
coerces employees in exercising their rights to bargain collectively and discriminates
against them for having done so, which violates §8 (a) (1) and (3).24
'8 Ibid.14Id. at 530.
"5Ibid.
'6 NLRB v. Truckdrivers Union [referred to as Buffalo Linen], 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954),
rev'd, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87, at 96 (1957).
Id. at 448.
x Betts Cadillac-Olds, Inc., supra note 2.
929 U.S.C. § 163 (1964): "Nothing is this subchapter, except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any wgy
the right to strike, or to affect the limitation or qualifications on that right."
°29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964): "It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to pro-
mote the full flow of commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing
the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, ... and to protect the
rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce."
I Betts Cadillac-Olds, Inc., supra note 2, at 283.
Quaker State Oil Refining Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 334, 337 (1958).
'American Ship Building, supra note 2, at 316.
21 Other areas which involve prima facia violations of § 8 (a) (1) and (3) are covered in
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The factual test of whether a lockout is offensive or defensive is difficult to apply
and can produce unpredictable results, as the Quaker State Oil25 case demonstrates.
There the majority of the Board found that the employer did not have reasonable
grounds to fear a sudden strike, but in the two dissenting opinions, the threat of a
strike was found to have been imminent, and thus, the lockout was thought justifi-
ably defensive.
26
A separate class of cases arose where the single employer was replaced with the
multi-employer unit.27 The same rubric was used to determine the validity of the
lockout, to wit, defensive lockouts were permissible. However, the strike of one mem-
ber of the unit was held to constitute a threat to the other member, which threat per
se constituted the type of economic problem which justified resort to a lockout. This
exception was intended to counterbalance the potent weapon of whipsaw strikes28
used by the unions.
29
In the instant case of the multi-employer unit exception was found inapplicable
as there was no contention that such a unit formally existed.30 The application of the
exception was argued by the News31 in view of the particular similarities of interests,
but the Court of Appeals used the Supreme Court's reasoning in American Ship
Building to render unnecessary any decision on the point.
Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion in American Ship Building, which
held that an employer, absent any unlawful design, may use the lockout "for the sole
purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining
position." 32 The Court rejected the Board's view that such use of the lockout was so
intrinsically destructive of a balance in collective bargaining, and so inconsistent with
employees' right to bargain collectively, that it could be classified as a prima facie
violation.33 The Court also rejected the Board's role as an arbiter of the economic
weapons to be used in collective bargaining.3 4 The Court noted that the employer
wished only to resist negotiation demands and modify them, and not to discourage
union membership or otherwise interfere with employees' collective bargaining
rights.3 5 The ruling that lockouts were permissible was limited to the facts of the case,
where an impasse 36 in negotiations had been reached. 37
Mr. Justice White concurred in the result on the theory that the employer had noti-
fied his customers of the possibility of a strike and this resulted in a lack of orders so
Radio Officers' Union v. Labor Board, 347 U.S. 17 (1953) and NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 U.S. 221 (1963).
Quaker State Oil Refining Co., supra note 21, at 334.
2aId. at 340, 341.
l Leonard v. Labor Board, 205 F.2d 355 (1953) [referred to as Davis Furniture], NLRB
v. Truckdrivers Local Union, supra note 16.
'Buffalo Linen, supra note 16, 109 N.L.R.B. at 448, 451, 353 U.S. 87, at n.7.
Publishers Ass'n. of New York City, 139 N.L.R.B. 1092, n.15 (1962).
80 Detroit Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, supra note 2, at 530.
31 The Evening News Association, supra note 3, at n.12.
82 American Ship Building, supra note 2, at n.5.
'Id. at 309, 312.
" Id. at 316.
mid. at 308-9.
"I Impasse denotes a deadlock in bargaining negotiations. CCH LAB. L. REP. 3120.
87 American Ship Building, supra note 2, at 318.
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the employer laid off his men, not locked them out.a8 He criticized the Board's deci-
sion but did not reject their role as arbiter.3 9 He said the Court erred in rejecting the
Board's assessment of the impact of the lockout without regard to motivation, and
predicted that:
if the Court means what it says today, an employer may not only lockout after
impasse consistent with §8 (a) (1) and §8 (a) (3), but replace his locked-out
employees with temporary help, cf. Labor Board v. Brown, ante, or perhaps
permanent replacements, and also lock out long before an impasse is reached.
4 0
Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by the Chief Justice, wrote an opinion concurring
in the result on the grounds the lockout was lawful because it was of the defensive
type condoned by the Board.4 1 Again the ambivalence of the offensive/defensive-use
test, first seen in the Quaker State Oil case, splinters a court.
Starting with the premise of the American Ship Building rule that a single em-
ployer can lock out to improve his bargaining strength, the previous permissible cate-
gory of multi-employer unit lockouts becomes superfluous. An employer is obviously
advancing his own bargaining position when, in response to a union's strike of an-
other employer over contract issues substantially the same as his own, the employer
closes ranks behind the struck employer by locking out his own employees.
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals extended American Ship Building by dropping
the impasse requirement. 4 2 In so doing it followed the rationale in American Ship
Building, that the Act itself establishes the criterion for violation. Moreover, in the
Act there is nothing to make the absence of an impasse before lockout a prima facie
violation, even though the majority in American Ship Building limited its ruling to
lockouts after an impasse. Here, then, is a case where the Court's rationale goes far
beyond the holding. The question remains how far the Court will follow its own
logic. If it views the lockout as analogous to the strike, then the impasse prerequisite
will have to fall since a strike may be called before an impasse is reached.
The NL.R.B. tried to blunt one edge of the strike-lockout sword to preserve the
balance in collective bargaining, but its device was an inconclusive test coupled to a
strained interpretation of the Act. The criticism of each Justice of the Supreme Court
brought focus on the susceptibility of the Board's test to unpredictable results and
the vulnerability of the Board's handling of the lockout area to charges of being high-
handed and overreaching. The Board may have to rethink its approach to lockouts
if it is to curtail their wholesale use and avoid industry and area wide work stoppages
over a single employer's dispute with a union. In the meantime cases such as Detroit




,o 1d. at 324.
"1 Id. at 327.
"Detroit Publishers Association, supra note 2, at 530. "While in American Ship Building
there was an impasse in negotiations between the employer and the union, we do not think
the teaching in that case merely adds another exception to the Board's category of per-
missible lockouts."
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